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A B S T R A C T
Good health is a function of a range of biological, environmental,
behavioral, and social factors. The consumption of quality health care
services is therefore only a part of how good health is produced.
Although few would argue with this, the economic framework used to
allocate resources to optimize population health is applied in a way
that constrains the analyst and the decision maker to health care
services. This approach risks missing two critical issues: 1) multiple
sectors contribute to health gain and 2) the goods and services
produced by the health sector can have multiple beneﬁts besides
health. We illustrate how present cost-effectiveness thresholds could
result in health losses, particularly when considering health-
producing interventions in other sectors or public health interven-
tions with multisectoral outcomes. We then propose a potentially
more optimal second best approach, the so-called coﬁnancing
approach, in which the health payer could redistribute part of its
budget to other sectors, where speciﬁc nonhealth interventions
achieved a health gain more efﬁciently than the health sector’s
marginal productivity (opportunity cost). Likewise, other sectors
would determine how much to contribute toward such an interven-
tion, given the current marginal productivity of their budgets. Further
research is certainly required to test and validate different measure-
ment approaches and to assess the efﬁciency gains from coﬁnancing
after deducting the transaction costs that would come with such
cross-sectoral coordination.
Keywords: coﬁnancing, cost-effectiveness threshold, economic
evaluation, multisectoral, public health interventions, social
determinants of health.
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Introduction
Health policymakers across the globe are facing difﬁcult ﬁnanc-
ing decisions having to balance a large unmet and rising demand
for health services, costly new drugs and technologies, ambitious
international guidelines, and severely constrained health budgets
[1]. To aid these decisions, a threshold is sometimes used to
determine which interventions are cost-effective and should
therefore be included in a prioritized package of health inter-
ventions [2]. For more than a decade, the Commission for Macro-
economics and Health and the World Health Organization’s
suggested threshold of 1 to 3 times a country’s gross domestic
product per capita per disability-adjusted life-year (DALY) averted
was accepted without much debate, or theoretical basis [3,4].
Nevertheless, there is now a general consensus that this suggested
threshold may not reﬂect the real opportunity costs of investing in
an intervention and that its application may cost lives [5–8].
Recently, there have been efforts to provide clariﬁcation on
what the threshold should represent, rooted in different
economic traditions [6,9,10]. In a welfarist framework that
accepts that the individual knows what is best and when
aggregate individual utility is the maximand of public policy, a
threshold could be derived from the marginal utility gained from
the consumption of goods or services that produce health [7,11].
This demand-side concept may be used, alongside other criteria,
to set the “health” budget, in relation to other uses of public
resources. Decisions of how to then spend a constrained health
budget can be better guided by an extrawelfarist framework, in
which health in itself is intrinsically valued and health max-
imization is the decision maker’s objective [12,13]. The decision
rule to allocate resources to a speciﬁc intervention is then based
on a supply-side threshold that reﬂects the marginal productivity
of the health system [9,14,15].
This conventional approach that underpins many health
economic evaluations often focuses on a single-sectoral payer
that seeks to maximize health, typically through interventions
delivered by the health care system. This approach risks missing
two critical issues: ﬁrst, multiple “sectors” contribute to the
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production of health, and second, some of the goods and services
produced by the “health sector,” or the healthcare system, have
multiple beneﬁts besides health [16,17]. There is a solid and
growing body of evidence on the social determinants of health,
which include poverty, education, gender inequity, housing, and
transport, among many others [18–21]. In fact, some argue that
population health is largely or even primarily impacted by
interventions in other sectors with other payers, which are
arguably not aiming to maximize health [22,23]. In the new global
development agenda, these structural determinants have come
to the forefront, with 17 sustainable development goals that
explicitly seek to tackle socioeconomic inequalities and environ-
mental factors hampering human development [24,25]. Global
health programs will increasingly have to compete for resources
with these upstream nonhealth programs, but could also stand to
greatly beneﬁt from their spillover health outcomes. Similarly,
public health interventions targeting populations or commun-
ities, rather than individuals, typically have wide-ranging cross-
sectoral impacts and cost implications. The spillover beneﬁts of
these interventions have gained prominence and helped to make
the case for greater investments [17,26,27].
There are at present a number of ways to deal with the
economic evaluation of interventions with multisectoral out-
comes [17,28–30]. The ﬁrst is the adoption of a welfarist cost-
beneﬁt approach that monetizes outcomes. Analysts grappling
with this in the ﬁelds of social care and environmental econom-
ics are leaning toward this option [29,31]. Yet the contentious
step of attaching a monetary value to life, health, and other social
outcomes is part of what led to the development of and health
decision makers’ preference for an extrawelfarist framework [14].
Within the extrawelfarist evaluation perspective, two approaches
exist that allow those in the health sector to incorporate non-
health consequences into their decision space. Most commonly,
costs are weighed against 1) composite outcome measures that
incorporate broader capabilities, or 2) multiple consecutive out-
come measures, with cost-consequence approaches [28,32].
Several current guidance documents also stipulate a variation
of the latter approach, whereby the nonhealth costs and effects
of interventions are to be reported and disaggregated by sector of
the economy or by payer, including the Gates Reference Case for
economic evaluation in global health, the National Institute for
Health and Care Excellence’s guidance for local government
decisions in England and Wales, and the second US panel’s
recommendations on cost-effectiveness analysis in health and
medicine [33–36]. The latter has even recommended the standard
reporting of two reference cases for every economic evaluation:
one from a health care sector perspective and the other from a
broader societal perspective, with the use of an impact inventory
to comprehensively report consequences beyond the formal
health care sector [36]. Following the same logic, evaluations of
nonhealth interventions should similarly consider non-negligible
health consequences. Nevertheless, even with impact inventories
for interventions across sectors, current guidance remains silent
on how a health payer should value consequences outside
the sector to decide on the most judicious allocation of its
resources.
Although the second US panel “recommends that analysts
should attempt to quantify and value non-health consequences,”
it also acknowledges that “there are no widely agreed upon
methods” for this and it remains unclear as to how to apply a
threshold based on opportunity cost to nonhealth impacts to
support investment decisions [36]. In the United Kingdom, the
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence’s guidance
further points out the lack of a standard method to apportion
costs when more than one government department or local
government is involved in delivering an intervention or is reaping
its beneﬁts [34,37].
In this article, we examine how efﬁcient current cost-
effectiveness thresholds are in dealing with interventions with
multisectoral outcomes, implemented within and outside the
health sector, and how this could be improved. We propose an
approach that retains the extrawelfarist perspective (that may
also apply to payers in other social sectors) and the principle of
opportunity cost to maximize each sector’s objectives, recogniz-
ing that each sector has its own budget constraint and real
opportunity cost. We start by illustrating how the current thresh-
olds could result in health losses, before proposing a potentially
more optimal second best approach. We then discuss some of the
associated measurement and application challenges and high-
light areas for future research.
Approaches to Resource Allocation: What Are the
Consequences of a Unisectoral Approach?
Culyer [38] has recently proposed a bookshelf metaphor to
resource allocation in health, whereby each book represents a
health care intervention (see Fig. 1). The height of the book
indicates its effectiveness in terms of health beneﬁt, and its
thickness captures its total cost. These books can be ranked in
order of their height, from left to right, and included in a national
health care package up to the point at which the health budget is
exhausted, similar to the league table approach [3,5]. The last
intervention to be included therefore represents a threshold of
health productivity per unit of expenditure (th), or the inverse of
the common cost-effectiveness ratio. It is the least productive
intervention provided, and any intervention that would be
considered to be added to the package would have to be at least
as productive to avoid a loss of population health. The threshold
is a direct function of the productivity of health interventions and
the size of the health budget.
If such a unisectoral approach is to achieve health max-
imization, one must make a number of assumptions, including
1) that the health budget reﬂects the allocation of public resour-
ces to health care rather than to health; 2) that the cost of any
health-producing intervention under consideration is fully borne
by the health budget; and 3) that the merit of any intervention is
solely determined by its impact on population health. A health-
producing intervention delivered outside the health sector (or a
public health intervention) is, however, likely to have other
nonhealth beneﬁts, and thus other payers that are willing to
allocate part of their budgets to it. We suggest and illustrate how,
in such cases, these underlying assumptions may result in health
losses. From here on, we refer to “nonhealth interventions” as
interventions with nonhealth primary objectives and spillover
health outcomes, whereas “public health interventions” will have
public health as a primary objective and spillover nonhealth
outcomes.
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Fig. 1 – The bookshelf of health care resource allocation [38].
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First, we examine what the “bookshelf” would look like if the
health budget is provided to a payer maximizing health, but that
can fund only health care services to do so. We consider a
stylized case in which the exogenous government budget is split
between two sectors or payers: a health payer and an education
payer. We also assume that the education payer does not have
health maximization as an objective, and would need to fully
fund any intervention if it were interested in its education
beneﬁts. It would follow a similar prioritization approach as the
health payer, with its own books ranked on a bookshelf according
to education productivity. In this case, any intervention that
improved health but was not provided within the health care
system, even if more efﬁcient, would not be prioritized, unless its
education beneﬁts were sufﬁcient to justify the education payer
fully funding it (e.g., the striped bar in Fig. 2). If not, this would be
at the cost of lives and/or quality of life (as represented by the
black area in Fig. 2). In reality, there may be speciﬁc activities or
tweaks of interventions in other sectors that would optimize
their positive health externalities, or mitigate their negative
health externalities, that would be better value for money than
certain existing health care interventions [16]. For example,
adding health modules in schools’ life skills curricula or provid-
ing micronutrient supplementation in schools could be relatively
low-cost interventions with signiﬁcant education, health, and
economic beneﬁts, but they have not always been embraced by
the health sector [39].
Second, we examine a situation in which the health budget is
provided to a payer maximizing health, which can fund
any health or education intervention to do so. We assume
that the education payer still does not have a health
objective, interventions are indivisible [40], and one payer must
bear the full cost of an intervention. In this case, some
interventions may not be funded, because they do not
generate sufﬁcient return in either sector (e.g., book 6 in
Fig. 3A,B).
Let us take the example of an education reform in Botswana.
In 1996, the government reformed the grade structure of secon-
dary schooling, effectively extending it by a year. Through a
natural experiment, De Neve et al. [41] found that this led to 0.79
additional years of secondary schooling among the affected
cohorts, with each added year reducing HIV risk remarkably by
8 percentage points. From the health payer’s perspective, at a
cost per HIV infection averted of US $27,753, this would have been
a less good investment than other HIV interventions, such as
male circumcision or treatment as prevention (ranging from US
$550 to US $8,375) [41], and it would not have been prioritized.
Although in this case it was actually implemented by the
education sector, one could imagine a scenario in which there
could have been more efﬁcient education policy options to
achieve the same educational impact, and even the education
payer may have chosen an alternative investment without health
spillovers.
Nevertheless, if we drop the assumption of indivisible costs
and allow multiple payers for one intervention, then the health
care cost (or contribution) could be lower than the total inter-
vention cost. The health productivity of an education interven-
tion per health dollar spent would therefore increase, as would
its education productivity. For example, if the cost of intervention
6 would be shared equally, then its health and education
productivity (per unit of expenditure) would double, making
it better value for money than health intervention 5 in
Figure 4A and education intervention 7 in Figure 4B. This would
allow both payers to prevent losses of health and education
outcomes (depicted by the black areas in both ﬁgures). As a
consequence, both sectors’ thresholds would shift up from th to
th’ and from te to te’ (in Fig. 4A,B) in terms of health/education
gain per dollar spent, reﬂecting the previous inefﬁciencies in
each sector.
A real-life example of this is a US $110,000 cash transfer
intervention in Malawi targeting girls of school-going age to keep
them in school, which was found to have a range of health,
education, and gender outcomes (including averting 94 HIV
DALYs) [42]. The initial analysis that took only the perspective
of HIV impact, indicated that it would not have been cost-
effective and the HIV budget holder would not have paid the full
Fig. 2 – Health loss from exclusion of nonhealth
interventions. Note. Pink-ﬁlled books are health care
interventions, while striped books are nonhealth interventions. The
black area represents the health loss from the exclusion of the latter
in the prioritisation process.
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Fig. 3 – Potential undervaluation of interventions with
multisectoral beneﬁts. (A) Health payer perspective. (B)
Education payer perspective. Note. The books numbered 1–5 are
health care interventions, and the books numbered 6–10 are
education interventions. The horizontal axis in (A) should be
read from left to right and that in (B) should be read from right
to left.
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cost. However, after incorporating the other outcomes and
payers’ cost-effectiveness thresholds, the HIV sector was found
to only need to allocate up to US $29,000 to the intervention,
bringing its HIV productivity up from about US $1,170 per HIV
DALY averted to US $339 [43]. Such a “book” would become taller
in this scenario and excluding it from the health budget could
result in a loss of health (as represented by the black area in
Fig. 4A).
Potential Solutions to Enabling Multisectoral
Synergies
In a “ﬁrst best” situation, we would imagine a central purchaser
of social welfare (including health and education gains) with
perfect information. This payer could choose all the most
efﬁcient interventions to maximize social welfare, regardless of
which sector they were implemented in. The efﬁciency gains
illustrated in Figures 4A and 4B would be realized by allocating
“health resources” across sectoral budget holders (ministries)
bearing their interventions’ spillover beneﬁts and costs into
account. This would result in the budgets allocated to each sector
shifting accordingly: the health sector budget would shrink
(pushing out intervention 5 in Fig. 3A), and the education budget
would grow to include intervention 6 (after excluding interven-
tion 7 in Fig. 3B).
In reality however, there is often no perfectly coordinated and
informed central decision maker. Overall sectoral budgets are set,
and then public investments in one sector tend to be evaluated
independently from investments in other sectors, which are
taken as “given.” This is known as the “second best” constraint
of real-world public sector decision making [44,45]. In practice,
governments are therefore more likely to allocate their health
outcome-earmarked budget in full to the Ministry of Health with
the mandate to maximize population health. Institutional man-
dates and policies thereafter tend to constrain ministries of
health to allocations to health care alone [13,44,46].
Accepting the second best scenario, a pragmatic option to
achieve a more optimal allocation is that the health payer
(Ministry of Health) could redistribute part of its budget to other
sectors, in which speciﬁc nonhealth interventions achieved a
health gain more efﬁciently than the health sector’s marginal
productivity (opportunity cost) hereafter referred to as a
“coﬁnancing” approach. Likewise, nonhealth sectors could trans-
fer part of their budgets into a coﬁnancing mechanism where
public health programs generate beneﬁts that they are also
interested in. This coﬁnancing approach recognizes the oppor-
tunity costs of different payers, but at the same time enables
additional improvements in both health and other sectors, and a
means to ﬁnance often highly efﬁcient upstream nonhealth or
public health interventions [43].
Although we focus on beneﬁts here, a similar approach could
be taken for interventions that impose costs on other sectors or
reduce their beneﬁts through negative externalities. For example,
if a speciﬁc health intervention led to an increase in the costs of
an education intervention, the education sector could end up
foregoing education beneﬁts from having to keep a now “thicker”
book on its shelf, and drop a more productive one. We could
think of the inclusion of a health education subject in the
curriculum, whereby schools may hypothetically have to divert
teachers and available school hours away from other important
subjects, negatively affecting students’ learning in those areas. If
these negative spillovers were taken into account, the education
sector could potentially be compensated through a larger share of
the budget, if the resulting health losses from a reduced budget
were valued less than the education losses.
Although not widespread, in practice, this coﬁnancing
approach is not unheard of. In some high-income countries, such
as the United Kingdom and Sweden, there have been initiatives
to pool budgets between health and social care for the manage-
ment of chronic health problems and disabilities in particular, to
overcome narrow sectoral interests and achieve efﬁciency sav-
ings [26,47]. In certain global health programs, investment plans
have been developed that include multiple sectors and health-
producing interventions outside the health sector, as well as
large-scale public health interventions with wide-ranging effects.
For example, the global strategic investment framework for HIV
identiﬁed structural interventions as integral components of
effective responses, including community mobilization, social
protection, and education programs, alongside basic HIV program
activities such as condom programming and antiretroviral ther-
apy [48]. Speciﬁcally, the South African HIV/Tuberculosis Invest-
ment case has included partial funding for child-focused cash
transfers and school feeding, among others, even though these
would be implemented in other non-HIV sectors [49].
Challenges and Areas for Future Research
At its core, any coﬁnancing approach requires a clear identiﬁca-
tion of a range of intervention outcomes and the sectoral payers
beneﬁting from the intervention. The second US panel’s recom-
mendation of a multisectoral impact inventory can be highly
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Fig. 4 – Health and education losses from measuring
productivity as a function of total costs instead of health or
education costs. (A) Health payer perspective. (B) Education
payer perspective. Note. Pink-ﬁlled books are interventions with
single sector beneﬁts, while the blue book (number 6) is an intervention
with multi-sectoral beneﬁts. The area in black represents the health/
education losses of not allowing for cost-sharing. The horizontal axis in
(A) should be read from left to right and that in (B) should be read from
right to left.
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useful in this respect. It would provide analysts from other
sectors the required information to support decisions on what
they may be willing to pay for “their” share of beneﬁts generated
by a health intervention, and it would encourage those within the
health sector to explore coﬁnancing arrangements to enable such
transfers. The same would be true for nonhealth interventions.
For example, in low- and middle-income settings, in which
resources may not be sufﬁcient to cover large-scale social
programs such as universal primary education, analytical and
institutional approaches that do not highlight and value multiple
beneﬁts may have particularly high opportunity costs.
Coﬁnancing also requires changes in public ﬁnance mecha-
nisms to ensure that interventions can be funded from different
sectors. Although Claxton et al. [13] demonstrated that public
health interventions with multisectoral costs and beneﬁts should
be funded if other sectors could compensate the implementing
sector in principle, in practice this compensation would need to be
real and a mechanism would need to be in place to allow for it.
Moreover, it is worth noting that while we simpliﬁed each sector
to a single payer, there are likely to be more payers with similar
objectives, but separate budget constraints. In low- and middle-
income countries, for example, where there is signiﬁcant external
development assistance for health, there would be separate
health payers, namely, a national public payer and donors, each
with their own thresholds. Even within government, it may be
relevant to consider the various levels of resource allocation,
especially where local governments are increasingly managing
decentralized and often unearmarked budgets [34,50].
Capturing and measuring multiple program outcomes is a
signiﬁcant challenge given data scarcity, with many evaluations
of global health interventions focusing on within-sector primary
outcomes, rather than exploring a range of sectoral outcomes. It
would also come at a cost, and would be warranted in as far as
the additional nonhealth consequences are signiﬁcant enough to
affect the results of the analysis, as has been recommended in
the second US panel [36]. In addition, the coﬁnancing approach
requires the determination of thresholds for different sectors in
order to estimate each payer’s potential contribution [43]. The
application of thresholds varies by sector, with some having cost-
effectiveness thresholds and others adopting cost-beneﬁt
approaches [29]. Two empirical approaches are presently being
explored in health and could be applied to other sectors. The ﬁrst
approach is to search for this threshold through econometric
analyses of health care expenditures and health outcomes to
estimate marginal productivity [9]. The other approach is to
search for the threshold by identifying the least cost-effective
intervention included in the package and the most cost-effective
intervention excluded, on the basis of published literature [38].
Although both approaches are promising, they require substan-
tial data, and may be difﬁcult to apply in some sectors with less
developed economic evaluation frameworks, and where a critical
mass of economic evaluations is not available [29,51,52].
Given the importance of ﬁnancing multisectoral interven-
tions, analysts may also consider using more pragmatic
approaches to estimate these thresholds, possibly exploring
willingness-to-pay (WTP) elicitation from decision makers, and
expert-informed threshold searching. Eliciting decision makers’
WTP for a gain in a unit of outcome from the production of a
service requires the assumption that this is their best estimate of
the opportunity cost. Nevertheless, such a measure is likely to
incorporate more than the criterion of efﬁciency, and may be
higher than the marginal productivity of the existing service
package, because decision makers will have imperfect informa-
tion, and would rightly have other criteria that determine their
WTP in practice, such as equity [53,54]. Their estimate of WTP is
at best likely to conﬂate these aims, and thus overestimate the
threshold, or be more aspirational [7]. Another potentially more
promising approach would be to use decision makers as experts
to identify the perceived least efﬁcient intervention they are
currently implementing, and the most efﬁcient intervention they
are not implementing, as a starting point, and then review
evidence on their cost-effectiveness. Nevertheless, both these
methods need further exploration and validation against the
range of empirical approaches currently being developed.
Conclusions
Good health is a function of a range of biological, environmental,
behavioral, and social factors. The consumption of quality health
care services is only a part of how good health is produced.
Although few would argue with this, the economic framework
used to allocate resources to optimize population health is
applied in a way that constrains the analyst and the decision
maker to health care services. As a result, lives and quality of life
may be lost. We propose a second best approach to decision rules
for health-producing interventions in nonhealth sectors, and
public health interventions with multisectoral effects, that could
bring a health decision maker closer to maximizing population
health in general, rather than through health care alone. This
would require the health payer to coﬁnance such interventions
with other sectors, on the basis of its cost-effectiveness thresh-
old. Likewise, other sectors would determine how much to
contribute toward such an intervention, given the present mar-
ginal productivity of their budgets.
The coﬁnancing approach is embedded in the prevailing
extrawelfarist framework of health economic evaluation. It does
not fundamentally question the framework but provides a theo-
retically consistent mechanism to bridge the health evaluative
space with other evaluative spaces, thereby going beyond a single
health outcome to bring allocations closer to the general equili-
brium that is sought in a welfarist framework. It fully aligns with
the decision maker’s perspective, whereby the focus is on societal
objectives (such as population health) rather than on aggregate
individual utility [12,14,15,53].
Nevertheless, the data and analytical demands of estimating
cost-effectiveness thresholds across multiple payers may hamper
the realization of such an efﬁciency-enhancing coﬁnancing
mechanism. Further research is called for to test and validate
various measurement approaches, to support the optimal allo-
cation of resources to global multisectoral and public health
interventions going forward.
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